Posts Tagged: Game theory


9
Oct 09

Economics for Business Lecture 9

Will the two prisoners cooperate, or will both...
Image via Wikipedia

In this lecture we introduce game theory, following recap over the risk and insurance parts of the module we looked at last week. Game theory is the study of strategic interaction. In this lecture we looked at the history of game theory and the components of any game: players, strategies, and payoffs. We also discussed the first equilibrium concept we are going to see: the Nash equilibrium.

Let us look at a few games in normal and Iterated forms, and talk about solution methods for these games when talking about the Prisoner’s dilemma. Click below for lecture notes, links, and a podcast of the lecture.

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2
Oct 08

EC4004 Lecture 8: Game Theory, Part 3

[print_link]

In the last lecture we extended the basics of game theory to think about ways in which we could find solutions to normal and extensive form games. Watch that lecture here. Thanks to Jason and Emma, you should have a good handle on the prisoner’s dilemma now.

In this lecture we’ll finish off talking about game theory by spending time talking about dominant and mixed strategies, subgame perfect equilibria, best response functions, and bac

kward induction.

Dominant Strategies

A dominant strategy refers to the best response to any strategy chosen by the other player. When a player has a dominant strategy in a game, there is good reason to predict that this is how the player will play the game.

A mixed strategy, in contrast, refers to situations when the player randomly selects from several possible actions.

The strategies in which a player chooses one action or another with certainty are called pure strategies.

We’ll illustrate these concepts using two famous games: Matching Pennies, which we have seen before, and the battle of the sexes.

Best Response Function

The function which gives the payoff-maximizing

choice for one player in each of a continuum of actions of the other player is referred to as the best-response function.

Figure 5. Reaction correspondence for a game with a dominated strategy.

Image via Wikipedia

Subgame Perfect Equilibria

Game theory offers a formal way of selecting the reasonable Nash equilibria in sequential games using the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium.

A proper subgame consists of the part of the game tree including an initial decision not connected to another in an oval and everything branching out below it.

Backward Induction

A shortcut to finding the subgame-perfect equlibrium directly is to use backward induction. Backward induction solves for the equilibrium by working backwards from the end of the game to the beginning. We’ll see this working in the battle of the sexes.

Click the link below to download the slides for the lecture. I’ll have them up at slideshare.net as well, and you can get a podcast of the lecture after the fact.

Right click to download Slides

In the next lecture, we’ll move on to talk about Production. The first half of the course is nearly over!


30
Sep 08

EC4004 Lecture 7, Game Theory, Part 2

A prisoner's dilemma with an outside option fo...

Image via Wikipedia

[print_link]

Last time we looked at the history of game theory and the components of any game: players, strategies, and payoffs. We also discussed the first equilibrium concept we are going to see: the Nash equilibrium.

In this lecture, we’ll look at a few games in normal and Iterated forms, and talk about solution methods for these games when talking about the Prisoner’s dilemma.
Click below for lecture notes, links, and slides.

26
Sep 08

Economics for Business, Lecture 6

Last time we looked at uncertainty, risk, and probability. We’ll recap those, and move onto Game Theory.

Click below for lecture notes, slides, and links to readings. A podcast of the lecture will be available after the lecture, as will a survey of the lecture. Don’t forget you can print these notes by clicking the [print_link] icons on the pages.

Continue reading →